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ABSTRACT
Providing the ability to any law enforcement officer to remotely transfer
an image from any suspect computer directly to a forensic laboratory for
analysis, can only help to greatly reduce the time wasted by forensic in-
vestigators in conducting on-site collection of computer equipment. RAFT
(Remote Acquisition Forensic Tool) is a system designed to facilitate forensic
investigators by remotely gathering digital evidence. This is achieved through
the implementation of a secure, verifiable client/server imaging architecture.
The RAFT system is designed to be relatively easy to use, requiring minimal
technical knowledge on behalf of the user. One of the key focuses of RAFT
is to ensure that the evidence it gathers remotely is court admissible. This
is achieved by ensuring that the image taken using RAFT is verified to be
identical to the original evidence on a suspect computer.
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CHAPTER
ONE
Introduction
1.1 Background
Current trends in technology are putting computers with high-bandwidth
Internet connections into the hands of regular criminals. As this phenomenon
continues, an increasing number of traditional crimes are being aided by
computers, e.g., fraud, identity theft, phishing, terrorism, online child sexual
exploitation etc. As a result, digital forensic investigators are becoming
overwhelmed with the number of cases they have to deal with. Traditional
digital forensic investigations commence with the investigators leaving their
laboratory to visit the crime scene, where they collect all the relevant evidence,
and bring it back to the forensic laboratory for secure storage and analysis.
This evidence may then lay untouched for extended periods while the invest-
igating team deals with the backlog of cases.
If regular law enforcement officers had the ability to remotely transfer an
image from any suspect computer directly to a forensic lab, it would help to
significantly reduce the investigation time used to conduct on-site collection
of computer equipment. The current approach for acquiring digital evidence
is based on impounding the suspect computer system and examining it in
a forensics laboratory. This examination is usually carried out on a copy of
the original data [1]. In this thesis, we introduce a solution to reduce the
time taken to acquire the necessary evidence. We propose RAFT (Remote
Acquisition Forensic Tool), a remote forensic hard drive imaging tool, that is
designed to boot off a Linux Live CD or USB memory stick. The evidence
acquisition is achieved through the implementation of a secure, verifiable
client/server imaging architecture. The suspect computer is booted using a
customised Linux Live distribution and any hard drives or removable media
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connected to the computer are able to be securely imaged over an Internet
connection directly to the RAFT Server. This system is designed to equip any
law enforcement or investigating officers with the ability to easily perform
digital evidence acquisition, which would traditionally require the expertise
of an on-site forensic investigator. One key objective of RAFT is to ensure that
any evidence gathered is court admissible. RAFT achieved this by ensuring
that any interactions the system has with the evidence are conducted in a
forensically sound, reliable and reproducible manner and that the imaged
evidence taken is forensically verified to be identical to the original evidence.
1.2 Primary Objectives
Many of existing digital evidence capturing tools are designed for use in a
forensic laboratory. These traditional digital forensic tools are all reliant in the
suspect computer equipment being seized and brought to the laboratory prior
to imaging the hard drives and collecting the evidence. The motivation for the
research detailed in this thesis is to equip regular law enforcement officers with
the ability to remotely collect digital forensic evidence directly at the crime
scene without requiring the presence of a digital forensic investigator. The
primary objectives of this research are as follows:
1. Provide an insight into the technical requirements of the design and
implementation of a remote forensic evidence acquisition tool and the
transmission of large volumes of digital forensic evidence over the
Internet.
2. Show the application of a remote digital evidence capturing system as a
plausible option for forensic investigation.
3. Design an architecture for a remote digital forensic evidence capturing
system. Such a system should be forensically verifiable, cost effective,
expandable, reliable and widely compatible with current computer
hardware. This system should improve on the time taken to get digital
evidence into an “investigation ready” state in the forensic laboratory,
while producing reliable, reproducible results.
4. Prototype the system and perform experimental analysis to measure the
viability of the system.
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5. Present the performance results achieved from testing the system.
6. Present applications and future potential applications of the system
designed.
1.3 Contribution of This Work
Many of the tools available in the field of digital evidence acquisition are
based upon the imaging and analysis taking place in a forensic laboratory, e.g.,
EnCase (Section 2.3.3), Forensic Toolkit (Section 2.3.4), FRED (Section 2.4.1),
etc. “Typically, only a small fraction of the examined data is of interest in
an investigation (e.g., one or two rogue machines out of tens, or hundreds).
Thus, a lot of the effort in copying and carefully examining a large number
of targets will be in vain” [1]. This existing research is concentrated around
the procedures that should be implemented after the physical confiscation of
the computer equipment. The research outlined as part of this thesis results
in relevant evidence being in an “investigation-ready” state as early into the
investigation as possible. The contribution of this research can be summarised
with the following points:
• Design of a forensically sound remote forensic digital evidence ac-
quisition system which will result in the collection of court-admissible
evidence. This system enables any law enforcement officer to capture
digital evidence and for this evidence to be sent directly to a server in the
forensic laboratory. This results in the forensic investigators being able
to spend more time in the laboratory analysing evidence, as opposed to
being in the field collecting it. This design extends to defining how to
best deal with the issues of cost, speed, compatibility and redundancy of
the system while ensuring that the process is reproducible and reliable.
• Proof of the viability of the system through experimentation of all the
necessary components. Each component in the system was individually
tested to ensure the forensic integrity of the data collected.
• Performance results from testing “real-world” scenarios where such a
system may be used, i.e., collecting evidence from a suspect computer in
residential environment and from a corporate computer in an enterprise
environment.
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1.4 Structure of This work
This thesis is organised as follows:
• After introducing the context and highlighting the main goals of the
project in Chapter 1, in Chapter 2 we present a literature review of related
research work and software tools relevant to the area of acquiring digital
forensic evidence remotely. This chapter outlines some of the tools,
systems, architectures, storage formats, and best practices associated
with the field of digital forensics from a technical, cryptographical and
legal perspective.
• Chapter 3 presents the architecture and design of the remote digital
evidence capturing system developed as part of this research. We also
outline the design goals which should be incorporated into tools of
this nature. A proof of concept, the Remote Acquisition Forensic Tool
(RAFT), is presented whereby an implementation of the system outlined
was built to the specifications outlined.
• Chapter 4 presents the results of comprehensive experiments carried
out to prove the viability of such a system. This involved testing each
component of the system to ensure the forensic integrity of the evidence
collected. Any minor change resulting from the handling of the source
devices and their digital copies, could result in any evidence discovered
on these devices being rendering inadmissible to the court. This chapter
also outlines the results of experiments conducted using the prototyped
forensic evidence acquisition tool in “real-world” scenarios.
• Chapter 5 summarises and concludes this research. This chapter also
outlines scenarios where the technology developed can be adapted and
reused for additional purposes. Guidelines for further developments to
this tool are also outlined and discussed.
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CHAPTER
TWO
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines some of the digital evidence acquisition and investiga-
tion software and hardware tools commonly used by forensic investigators in
law enforcement and private investigations such as EnCase, Forensic ToolKit
and the Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device (FRED). Current research
and open-source tools are outlined specifying their benefits and designs,
e.g., Bluepipe, DCFLDD. Common digital evidence storage formats are also
discussed, outlining the cross-compatibility between the tools available and
the associated formats. Best practices associated with the field of digital
forensics from a technical, cryptographical and legal perspective are discussed.
2.2 Digital Forensic Investigation
Generally speaking, the goal of a digital forensic investigation is to identify
digital evidence relative to a specific cybercrime. Investigations rarely rely
entirely on digital evidence to prosecute the offender, instead relying on a case
built from physical evidence, digital evidence, witness testimony and cross-
examination. However, when dealing solely with digital evidence, there are
three major phases [2]:
1. Acquisition Phase – The acquisition phase is concerned with capturing the
state of a digital system for later analysis. This is similar to the collection
of physical evidence from a crime scene, e.g., taking photographs,
collecting fingerprints, fibres, blood samples, tire patterns, etc. During
this phase, it is generally very difficult to tell which evidence is relevant
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to the case, so the goal of this phase is to save all possible digital values
(including all allocated and unallocated space on any storage device).
2. Analysis Phase – After a successful and complete acquisition of the system
state from a suspect computer, the data acquired needs to be analysed
to identify pieces of evidence. The analysis of evidence is carried out
on an exact copy of the original evidence. This copy is verified against
the original through the use of a hashing algorithm, as outlined in more
detail in section 2.7. Carrier [2] defines three major categories of evidence
a digital investigator needs to discover when conducting his analysis:
• Inculpatory Evidence – This is any evidence which supports a given
theory.
• Exculpatory Evidence – This is any evidence which contradicts a
given theory.
• Evidence of Tampering – This is any evidence which cannot be
related to any theory currently under investigation, but shows that
the system was tampered with to avoid identification.
The procedure followed during this phase includes examining file and
directory contents (including recovered deleted content) to draw verifi-
able conclusions based on any evidence that was found.
3. Presentation Phase – The steps performed in the previous two steps are
the same regardless of the type of investigation being conducted, e.g.,
corporate, law enforcement or military. However, the presentation phase
will be different depending on corporate policy or local law. This
phase presents the conclusions and their corresponding evidence that the
digital investigator has deduced. In a court settings, the lawyers must
first evaluate the evidence to confirm that it is court admissible.
2.3 Digital Forensic Software Tools
While the area of Computer Forensics and Cybercrime Investigation is a
relatively new evolution of the more traditional computer security model,
there are a small number of companies, research projects and open-source
tools dedicated to aid the forensic investigator in conducting the acquisition
and analysis of forensic evidence. A number of these tools are discussed in the
following subsections:
6
2.3.1 Bluepipe
Bluepipe is a live digital forensic system for *NIX platforms that is a viable
alternative to the traditional post-mortem analysis created by Y. Gao, G.G.
Richard III and V. Roussev [3]. The creators published a paper in the
International Journal of Digital Evidence entitled “Bluepipe: A Scalable
Architecture for On-the-Spot Digital Forensics” [1]. In this paper, the authors
presented the Bluepipe architecture and the Bluepipe remote forensic protocol.
The Bluepipe architecture was designed to counteract the following issues
with the traditional approach to forensic evidence acquisition:
1. How invasive the impounding of suspect computers can be to an
operational business. If the collection of evidence is as non-invasive
as possible, i.e., not requiring the business to shut down and part with
operational equipment, it is more likely that a business will willingly
cooperate with the investigation, assuming no warrant has been granted.
2. Some businesses could have sensitive information stored on their com-
puter equipment which is of a very high level of confidentiality and
potentially irrelevant to the investigation being processed outside of the
company.
3. The logistical implications of moving and storing a large volume of com-
puter equipment from a company’s premises to the forensics laboratory.
4. Not all the collected information is relevant to the investigation and
usually the relevant evidence is a very small proportion of the total
collected.
Bluepipe is designed on a client/server paradigm. The server runs on the
target machine, while the forensic investigator runs the client. The server’s
responsibility is to execute any commands received from the client through
the Bluepipe protocol. The communication between the client and server is
supported through Bluetooth and 802.11 wireless networking. The Bluepipe
protocol is capable of sending simple XML based commands to the target
machines such as locate, get, grep, listdir, listpartitions and hash. These
commands enable the investigator to browse around the target machine
remotely and attempt to discover any evidence relevant to the case he is
investigating.
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2.3.2 DCFLDD
DCFLDD is a digital forensic imaging tool created by the Department of
Defence Computer Laboratory in the United States [4]. It is an enhanced
version of the GNU “dd” *NIX command included in a collection of tools
called Forensic and Incident Response Environment (FIRE). DCFLDD is a
natural progression of the “dd” command with additional forensic oriented
features such as [5]:
• On-the-fly Hashing – While the input is being copied, it is possible for
a configurable hash value to be simultaneously computed. The dcfldd
command is capable of calculating most common hash functions, as
outlined in 2.7.3.
• Split Output – The tool is capable of splitting the output at a defined size.
This is especially a useful option if the resultant collected data needs to
be stored on a fixed size medium, e.g., a CD or DVD.
• Piped Output – The data collected through the dcfldd command is capable
of being output to any other program by way of a pipe.
• Logging – The tool is capable of creating log files with hash values, input
and output locations, disk sizes and other useful information.
The evidence captured using DCFLDD is stored in the “raw format”, outlined
in 2.5.2, and as a result it is compatible with any of the analysis tools on
the market (both open source and commercial). It is possible to configure
the dcfldd command with command line arguments to save the hashes of all
collected files into a separate file. A sample usage of the dcfldd command is
shown below [5]:
dcfldd -hashwindow=BYTE -hash=sha512 -hashlog=FILE
if=DISK1 of=DISK2
An explanation of the command lines arguments outlined is included below:
• hashwindow – This argument specifies how often the program should
hash the data copied, i.e., after how many bytes should each hash be
produced. It’s possible to send a single copy of a file and create many
hash values for each sequential chunk of the file.
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Figure 2.1: Screenshot of EnCase Forensic showing its analysis of the internet
history of a collected hard drive image. EnCase collates the history from
Internet Explorer, Mozilla, Opera and Macintosh Safari [6].
• hash – This specifies which hash function to use. Acceptable values
are md5, sha1, sha256, sha384 or sha512. Multiple hash sums can be
computed simultaneously by including the required hash names in a
comma separated list, e.g., md5,sha384.
• hashlog – Send the hash sums produced to a file as opposed to the stderr.
• if (Input File) – Read from a file instead of stdin. The direct path to a
partition or a hard disk can be passed here as an argument, e.g.,
if=/dev/sda3
• of (Output File) – Write to a file instead of stdout. Multiple output files can
be specified for the data being copied to be written to multiple locations
simultaneously.
2.3.3 EnCase
EnCase is a forensics image acquisition, analysis and reporting tool created
by Guidance Software [6]. By many professionals, it is seen as the de
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facto standard for digital investigations. Over 2000 law enforcement agen-
cies worldwide use EnCase according to Jennifer Higdon, spokesperson for
Guidance Software [7]. The EnCase Forensic tool is capable of performing a
multitude of tasks for the investigator, such as [6]:
1. Evidence Acquisition – Acquisition of data from a locally connected hard
disk. The hard disk is generally connected to the forensic workstation
through a write-blocker.
2. Automated Tools – These automated processes operate after the user
configures a range of filters to examine a drive. For example, the
highlighting of all digital images/photographs, recovery of any deleted
partitions and extraction of the registry information is all automated.
3. Analysis – EnCase is capable of quickly displaying, searching and parsing
over 400 file formats, any internet, email and instant messaging histories
(as is shown in the screenshot in Fig. 2.1), and numerous file system
formats. The investigator has the ability to bookmark any discovered
evidence for later ease of access and reporting.
4. Reporting – A number of automatic reports are available including a list
of all files and folders, detailed web history, log records, hard drive
information (including partition information) and bookmarked files and
images.
2.3.4 Forensic Toolkit
Forensic Toolkit (FTK) is a tool created by Access Data [8]. FTK has similar
functionality to EnCase, i.e., it is an “all-in-one” image acquisition, analysis
and reporting tool with the ability to automate common investigative tasks.
As can be seen in Fig. 2.2, FTK is capable of the automatic organisation
of data into categories (as can be seen with the tabs along the top of the
window). A notable feature of FTK is that it has the capability to use a
database-driven architecture to keep track of the analysis of a given disk for
distributed analysis. This distributed analysis is used for automated data pre-
processing, e.g., recovering deleted files and partitions, structuring files into
categories etc. It also includes “Password Recovery Toolkit” and “Distributed
Network Attack”. Password Recovery Toolkit enables the investigators to
crack the password of over 80 different applications using brute force methods.
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Figure 2.2: Screenshot of Access Data’s Forensic ToolKit (FTK) showing the
categories of automatically collected files.
The Distributed Network Attack utilises multiple computers in a distributed
system to perform dictionary attacks on encrypted or password protected files.
FTK Imager is the evidence capturing tool packaged along with the Forensic
Toolkit. As can be seen in Fig. 2.3, the tool is capable of showing a live
preview of the content on a suspect disk. This could positively influence the
investigation by targeting the analysis at the relevant areas. The FTK Imager
is capable of producing images in the raw data format, as outlined in section
2.5.2, [9].
2.4 Digital Forensic Hardware
The current standard hardware device used for digital evidence acquisition in
the forensic laboratory is the FRED workstation, as outlined in section 2.4.1
below, and the portable FRED called the FREDDIE, as outlined in section2.4.2.
Both of these hardware devices are bundled with a number of write-blocked
connections for acquiring evidence from common storage devices.
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Figure 2.3: Screenshot of FTK Imager showing its image directory preview.
FTK Imager allows the investigator to examine the live contents of a hard drive
(both in the allocated and unallocated space) and allows the investigator to
take a forensically sound image of the disk [8].
2.4.1 Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device
The Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device (FRED) is a collection of equipment
tailored for digital investigations available from Digital Intelligence [10]. Fig.
2.4 shows the FRED workstation with the write blocked disk connection
ports on the front of the device. The shelf at the front of the device is non-
conductive and contains fans to cool the disk during evidence acquisition.
Each FRED contains a collection of write-blocked (read-only) ports including
SATA, IDE, SCSI, USB and FireWire. The FRED system is designed to aid
digital investigators by ensuring that all interactions with the original source of
evidence is read-only. FREDs are still reliant on a standard operating system,
e.g., a Windows variant, and one or more of the software acquisition and
analysis tools described above.
It is the only hardware tool with a write blocked FireWire port. This enables
it to acquire evidence from Apple Mac computers booted into FireWire mode,
i.e., giving direct access to the hard disk through the FireWire port without
booting the full operating system. FRED systems are also capable of acquiring
write-blocked data from floppies, CDs, DVDs and a variety of memory card
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Figure 2.4: Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device from Digital Intelligence [10]
formats such as Compact Flash, Micro Drives, Smart Media, Memory Stick,
Memory Stick Pro, xD Cards, Secure Digital Media and Multimedia Cards.
2.4.2 Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device Diminutive
Interrogation Equipment
Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device Diminutive Interrogation Equipment
(FREDDIE) is the portable configuration of FRED [11]. It is capable of much
of the same functionality of FRED device, with the only downsides being that
due to its portable design, there is a physical hard disk limitation as to how
many different sources of evidence you are able to capture during the same
excursion. This limitation is easily avoided when using the full sized FRED, as
it is generally connected to a large network attached storage device.
2.5 Evidence Storage Formats
There is currently no universal standard for the format that digital evidence
and any case related information is stored. This is due to the fact that there are
no state or international governmental policies to outline a universal format.
Many of the vendors developing forensic tools have developed their own
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Figure 2.5: Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device Diminutive Interrogation
Equipment from Digital Intelligence [11]
proprietary format. With such a relatively small target market, it sometimes
makes business sense for them to try and lock their customers into buying
only their software in the future. There have been a small number of attempts
at creating open formats to store evidence and any related metadata. This
section describes the most common of these formats below.
2.5.1 Common Digital Evidence Storage Format
The Common Digital Evidence Storage Format (CDESF) Working Group
was created as part of the Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DRFWS) in
2006. The goal of this group was to create an open data format for storing
digital forensic evidence and associated metadata from multiple sources, e.g.,
computer hard drives, mobile Internet devices, etc. [12]. The format which
the CDESF working group were attempting to create would have specified
metadata capable of storing case-specific information such as case number,
digital photographs of any physical evidence collected and the name of the
digital investigator conducting the investigation. In 2006, the working group
produced a paper outlining the advantages and disadvantages of various
evidence storage formats [9].
Ultimately due to resource restrictions, the CDESF working group was disban-
ded in 2007 before accomplishing their initial goal.
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2.5.2 Raw Format
According to the CDESF Working Group, “the current de facto standard for
storing information copied from a disk drive or memory stick is the so-called
“raw” format: a sector-by-sector copy of the data on the device to a file” [13].
The raw format is so-called due to the fact that it is simply a file containing the
exact sector-by-sector copy of the original evidence, e.g., files, hard disk/flash
memory sectors, network packets, etc. Raw files are not compressed in any
manner and as a result, any deleted or partially overwritten evidence that may
lay in the slackspace of a hard disk is maintained. All of the commercial digital
evidence capturing tools available today have the capability of creating raw
files. Digital evidence stored in the raw format is also compatible with all of
the commercial digital investigation analysis tools outlined in 2.3.
2.5.3 Advanced Forensic Format
The Advanced Forensic Format (AAF) is an open source, extensible format
created by S. Garfinkel in Basis Technology in 2006 [14]. The AAF format has
a major emphasis on efficiency and as a result is partitioned into two layers;
the disk representation layer which defines segment name used for storing
all data associated with an image and the data storage layer which defines
how the image is stored, be it binary or XML[15]. The format specifies three
variants; AFF, AFD and AFM. AFF stores all data and metadata in a single file,
AFD stores the data and metadata in multiple small files, and AFM stores the
data in a raw format and the metadata is stored in a separate file [9]. [15]
2.5.4 Generic Forensic Zip
Generic Forensic Zip (gfzip) is an open source project to create a forensically
sound compressed digital evidence format based on AAF 2.5.3 [16]. Due to
the fact that it is based upon the AAF format, there is limited compatibility
between the two in terms of segment based layout. One key advantage that
gfzip has over the AAF format is that gfzip seeks to maintain compatibility
with the raw format 2.5.2. It achieves this by allowing the raw data to be
placed first in the compressed image [15].
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2.5.5 Digital Evidence Bag (QinetiQ)
The method for traditional evidence acquisition involves a law enforcement
officer collecting any relevant items at the crimescene and storing the evidence
in bags and seals. These evidence bags may then be tagged with any relevant
case specific information, such as [17]:
• Investigating Agency / Police Force
• Exhibit reference number
• Property reference number
• Case/Suspect name
• Brief description of the item
• Date and time the item was seized/produced
• Location of where the item was seized/produced
• Name of the person that is producing the item as evidence
• Signature of the person that is producing the item
• Incident/Crime reference number
• Laboratory reference number
Physical evidence containers, such as evidence bags, are trusted due to the
well understood and practised process called “chain of custody” [18].
Digital Evidence Bag (DEB) is a digital version of the traditional evidence bag,
created by Philip Turner in 2005 [17]. DEB is based on an adaptation of existing
storage formats, with potentially infinite capacity. The data stored in a DEB is
stored in multiple files, along with metadata containing the information that
would traditionally be written on the outside of an evidence bag. There are
currently no tools released that are compatible with the DEB format.
2.5.6 Digital Evidence Bag (WetStone Technologies)
In 2006, C. Hosmer, from WetStone Technologies Inc., published a paper
outlining the design of a Digital Evidence Bag (DEB) format for storing digital
evidence [18]. This format for storing is independent from the Digital Evidence
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Bag outlined in 2.5.5. The format emerged from a research project funded by
the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory. The motivation for this format was
similar to the motivation for that described in 2.5.5, i.e., to metaphorically
mimic the plastic evidence bag used by crime scene investigators to collect
physical evidence such as blood, fibres, hairs etc. This format will be released
publicly when complete.
2.5.7 EnCase Format
The EnCase format for storing digital forensic is proprietary to the evidence
analysis tool of the same name as outlined in section 2.3.3. It is by far
the most common evidence storage option used by law enforcement and
private digital investigation companies [15]. Because of the proprietary
nature of the format, along with the lack of any formal specification from
Guidance Software [6], much remains unknown about the format itself. Some
competitors to Guidance Software have attempted to reverse engineer the
format to provide an element of cross-compatibility with their tools [14].
EnCase stores a disk image as a series of unique compressed pages. Each
page can be individually retrieved and decompressed in the investigative
computer’s memory as needed, allowing a somewhat random access to the
contents of the image file. The EnCase format also has the ability to store
metadata such as a case number and an investigator [14].
2.6 Evidence Handling
When analysing physical evidence, the commonly used procedure is known
as the “chain of custody” [17]. The chain of custody commences at the crime
scene where the evidence is collected, when the investigating officer collects
any evidence he finds and places it into an evidence bag. This evidence bag
will be sealed to avoid any contamination from external sources and signed
by the officer and will detail some facts about the evidence, e.g., description of
evidence, location it was found, date and time found etc. The chain of custody
will then be updated again when the evidence is checked into the evidence
store in the forensic laboratory. When it comes to analysing the evidence, it will
be checked out to the analysts’ custody and any modification to the evidence
required to facilitate the investigation, e.g., taking a sample from a collected
fibre to determine its origin or unique properties. Each interaction with the
17
evidence will be logged and documented.
The procedures outlined above for physical evidence need to be slightly
modified for digital evidence acquisition and analysis. Due to the fact that
digital evidence is analysed on forensic workstations, most of the above
sequences can be automated into concise logging of all interactions. During
a digital investigation, there is no requirement to modify the existing evidence
in any way. This is because all analysis is conducted on an image of the
original source and any discovered evidence can be extracted from this image,
documented and stored separately to both the original source and the copied
image. It is imperative when dealing with all types of evidence that all
procedures used are reliable, reproducible and verifiable. In order for evidence
to be court admissible, it must pass the legal criteria for the locality that the
court case is being heard, as outlined in greater detail in section 2.8 below.
2.6.1 What does “Forensically Sound” really mean?
Many of the specifications for digital forensic acquisition tools, analysis tools,
storage formats and hash functions state that the product in question is
“forensically sound” or that the product works with the digital evidence in a
“forensically sound manner”, without specifying exactly what the term means.
In 2007, E. Casey published a paper in the Digital Investigation Journal entitled
“What does “forensically sound” really mean ?” [19].
In this paper, Casey outlines some of the common views of forensic profes-
sionals regarding dealing with digital forensic evidence. Purists state that
any digital forensic tools should not alter the original evidence in any way.
Others point out that the act of preserving certain types of evidence necessarily
alters the original, e.g., a live memory evidence acquisition tool must be
loaded into memory (altering the state of the volatile memory and possibly
overwriting some latent evidence) in order to run the tool and capture any
evidence contained in the memory. Casey then goes onto to explain how
some traditional forensic process require the altering of some of the evidence
in order to collect the required information. For example, collecting DNA
evidence requires taking a sample from some collected evidence, e.g., a hair.
Subsequently, the forensic analysis of this evidentiary sample (DNA profiling)
is destructive in its nature which further alters the original evidence.
Casey summarises that from a forensic standpoint, evidence acquisition and
handling should modify the evidence as little as possible and when modifica-
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tion is unavoidable, it should be well documented and considered in the final
analytical results. “Provided the acquisition process preserves a complete and
accurate representation of the original data, and its authenticity and integrity
can be validated, it is generally considered forensically sound” [19].
2.6.2 Splitting Evidence
It is not always possible to store the entire image of a particular storage
device in one large file. This could be for a number of reasons, such as the
evidence being stored on a FAT32 formatted hard drive which is only capable
of addressing a file less than 232 bytes (4,294,967,296 bytes or 4 gigabytes)
or if evidence needs to be backed up to external media, e.g., a data CD or
DVD, capable of storing 700MB and 4.7GB respectively. If this evidence is
going to be transmitted over the Internet, it should be a requirement of any
such system to split the evidence into smaller parts to minimise the cost of
dropped connections. The CDESF working group conducted a survey in 2006
and found that each of the evidence storage formats they tested was capable
of allowing split archiving and storage of evidence [9].
Should any tool split the evidence during acquisition, for transmission or
storage purposes, this collected evidence should be recompilable into the
original source for examination purposes. To ensure forensic integrity, the
tools used for splitting and recompiling the evidence should be able to verify
the recompiled image against the original untouched source.
2.6.3 Compressing Forensic Evidence
Compressing digital forensic evidence into common compressed formats, e.g.,
*.zip, *.rar, *.7z, *.tar.gz, etc., would result in an unrecoverable loss of evidence.
When evidentiary data is compressed it is imperative for only uninitiated
space on a disk to be excluded from the compressed file. If compressing an
entire hard drive, each of the aforementioned compression functions will not
include any slackspace on the drive. This slackspace can contain files and
evidence that the suspect user has deleted from his computer, assuming that
the particular sectors that were used to store the file have not already been
overwritten. There are some evidence storage formats, as outlined in section
2.5, which compress the data collected in a forensically sound manner.
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2.7 Cryptographic Hash Functions
Cryptographic hash functions are deterministic procedures which operate
by taking in a block of data and produce a fixed length digital fingerprint
or cryptographic hash value/sum. The data input to a hash function is
commonly referred to as the “message“, while the hash sum produced is
referred to as the digest.
The ideal collision resistant cryptographic hash function (h) has four main
properties, defined by B. Preneel as part of his Ph.D. thesis in 1993 [20]:
1. The description of h must be publicly known and should not require any
secret information for its operation.
2. The argument/message X can be of arbitrary length and the result h(X)
has a fixed length of n bits (with n ≥ 128).
3. Given h and X, the computation of h(X) must be “easy”.
4. The hash function must be one-way in the sense that given a Y in the
image of h, it is infeasible to find a message X such that h(X) = Y , i.e., it
should be impractical to modify a message without changing its hash. It
should also be infeasible given X and h(X) to find a message X’ 6= X such
that h(X’) = h(X), i.e., finding two different messages with the same hash
should be unattainable.
5. The hash function must be collision resistant: this means that one should
not find two distinct messages that hash to the same result. It also should
not be feasible to find a message X that has a given hash sum h(X).
2.7.1 Collision Resistance
The measure of the unlikelihood of two different inputs to a hashing function
returning the same hash sum is known as the collision resistance of the hash
function. Generally speaking, the larger the internal state size that the hashing
function has to operate with, the better the collision resistance of that function.
In 2005, Wang and Yu published a paper outlining their attempts to break a
number of specified hash functions, entitled “How to Break MD5 and Other
Hash Functions” [21]. In this paper they described a method for engineering
two files which, when hashed using MD5, would result in having the same
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hash sum. In their experiments, they created two different files, F1 and F2, by
reverse engineering them to have the specific bits in the specific file locations
required for the hashing function to produce an identical hash sum. It is
important to note that there currently is no documented evidence that, if given
a specific file F1, that anyone is capable of engineering a second file F2 that has
the same hash sum. As a result of this paper, the United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), part of the United States’ Department
of Homeland Security, published a vulnerability note stating that MD5 should
be considered cryptographically broken and unsuitable for further use and
that most United States governmental applications will be required to move to
the SHA-2 family of hashing functions by 2010 [22].
To date, no collisions have been found in any of the SHA-2 family of hashing
functions.
2.7.2 Avalanche Effect
The avalanche effect of a cryptographic hashing function refers to a desirable
property whereby should the input file be modified slightly [23], e.g., changing
a single bit of the file, the resultant hash sum produced changes significantly.
The term “avalanche effect” used to describe this property was created by H.
Feistel in 1975 [24]. Table 2.1 shows a sample set of common hashing functions
along with sample hash sums they produce for two slightly different input
files showing the influence the avalanche effect has on each function.
2.7.3 Overview of Common Hashing Algorithms
While there are hundreds, if not thousands, of hashing functions in existence,
the list of commonly used functions is significantly shorter. This is due to
the fact that the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) and
the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States have prioritised the
standardisation of hashing functions. The most popular hashing functions,
outlined below, are all based on the message digest principle. The message di-
gest principle was designed by Ronald Rivest and constitutes a hash function
taking in a message of arbitrary length and producing a fixed length message
digest (hash value/sum) based on that input.
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Hash
Algorithm
Length
in bits
The quick brown fox
jumps over the lazy
dog
The quick brown fox
jumps over the lazy
cog
Diff
%
Adler32 32 5BDC0FDA 5BD90FD9 25.0%
CRC32 32 414FA339 4400B5BC 87.5%
Haval 128 713502673D67E5FA
557629A71D331945
4C9409BE8321D982
72D9252F610FBB5B
93.8%
MD2 128 03D85A0D629D2C44
2E987525319FC471
6B890C9292668CDB
BFDA00A4EBF31F05
93.8%
MD4 128 1BEE69A46BA81118
5C194762ABAEAE90
B86E130CE7028DA5
9E672D56AD0113DF
93.8%
MD5 128 9E107D9D372BB682
6BD81D3542A419D6
1055D3E698D289F2
AF8663725127BD4B
100%
RipeMD128 128 3FA9B57F053C053F
BE2735B2380DB596
3807AAAEC58FE336
733FA55ED13259D9
93.8%
RipeMD160 160 37F332F68DB77BD9
D7EDD4969571AD67
1CF9DD3B
132072DF69093383
5EB8B6AD0B77E7B6
F14ACAD7
95.0%
SHA-1 160 2FD4E1C67A2D28FC
ED849EE1BB76E739
1B93EB12
DE9F2C7FD25E1B3A
FAD3E85A0BD17D9B
100DB4B3
95.0%
SHA-256 256 D7A8FBB307D78094
69CA9ABCB0082E4F
8D5651E46D3CDB76
2D02D0BF37C9E592
E4C4D8F3BF76B692
DE791A173E053211
50F7A345B46484FE
427F6ACC7ECC81BE
95.3%
SHA-384 384 CA737F1014A48F4C
0B6DD43CB177B0AF
D9E5169367544C49
4011E3317DBF9A50
9CB1E5DC1E85A941
BBEE3D7F2AFBC9B1
098CEA620B0978CA
A5F0BEFBA6DDCF22
764BEA977E1C70B3
483EDFDF1DE25F4B
40D6CEA3CADF00F8
09D422FEB1F0161B
95.8%
SHA-512 512 07E547D9586F6A73
F73FBAC0435ED769
51218FB7D0C8D788
A309D785436BBB64
2E93A252A954F239
12547D1E8A3B5ED6
E1BFD7097821233F
A0538F3DB854FEE6
3EEEE1D0E11733EF
152A6C29503B3AE2
0C4F1F3CDA4CB26F
1BC1A41F91C7FE4A
B3BD86494049E201
C4BD5155F31ECB7A
3C8606843C4CC8DF
CAB7DA11C8AE5045
96.1%
Table 2.1: Example hash sums for a small file containing the sentence outlined.
The percentage difference shows the difference in the hash sums produced.
While each character of a hash is hexadecimal, i.e., 1 of 16 possible values, it is
notable that some hashing functions have differences greater than the expected
maximum difference, i.e.,>93.8%. This is due to a more pronounced avalanche
effect in the hashing function.
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2.7.3.1 MD Family
The Message Digest algorithm family of hash functions were all created by
Ronald Rivest, a professor in Massachusetts Institute of Technology, along
with some collaboration from others. The family contains six iterations of
the algorithms; MD, MD2 (1988), MD3 (1989), MD4(1990), MD5 (1991) and
MD6 (2008.) From the original iteration up as far as MD5, the algorithms all
produced 128-bit message digests. These MD hash values are expressed as 32
hexadecimal digits, as can be seen in table 2.1. MD6 is based on a variable
length message digest size to improve performance for smaller inputs, and as
a result the message digest can be anywhere in the range from 0 - 512 bits in
length.
MD5 is a popular hash function used in numerous applications. Most of the
tools available to the digital investigator rely on a combination of the CRC32
and the MD5 hash functions for maintaining data integrity [9].
MD6 was entered into the competition for the SHA-3 Family of hash functions.
However, in July 2009, the algorithm was withdrawn from the competition
because in order for it to be fast enough to compete, the design would have
had to compromise its resistance to differential attacks.
2.7.3.2 SHA-0 and SHA-1 Family
The first specification of the Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA) family of
hashing functions was published in 1993 by the US National Institute for
Standards and Technology. This early specification is now known as the SHA-0
function. SHA-0 was withdrawn from use by the US National Security Agency
in 1995 and was replaced by a modified version of the function; SHA-1. Both
SHA-0 and SHA-1 produce 160-bit hash sums and they have a maximum input
message size of 264 − 1 bits (or 2048 petabytes).
X. Wang, Y.L. Yin and H. Yu produced a paper entitled “Finding Collisions
in the Full SHA-1” in 2005 [25]. This paper outlined the first attack on the
SHA-1 hash function. The authors successfully found collisions on the SHA-1
function. They achieved this by first finding near-collisions. They then were
able to discover full collisions based on the analysis of the near collisions.
They conclude that although the SHA-1 family of hash functions has message
expansion, it does not offer enough avalanche effect in terms of differing
inputs.
23
2.7.3.3 SHA-2 Family
The SHA-2 Family consists of the following hash functions: SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The number in the name of the hash function
represents the output message digest size in bits. H. Gilbert and H. Handschuh
produced a journal paper entitled “Security Analysis of SHA-256 and Sisters”
in 2004 [26] which published their results from the analysis of the SHA-2
family of hash functions. They found that the attacks that have broken the
SHA-1 family no longer are applicable to the SHA-2 family.
The SHA-224 and SHA-256 have the same maximum input file size of 264 − 1
bits (or 2048 petabytes) as with the SHA-1 Family, while the SHA-384 and
SHA-512 have a maximum of 2128 − 1 bits (or 3.78 x 1022 petabytes).
2.7.3.4 SHA-3 Family (in development)
The United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), part
of the Department of Commerce, are holding a development competition to
decide on which hashing function to choose for the third iteration of the SHA
Family. As part of the competition, NIST accepted over 50 entries into the
first round of testing. This number was reduced down to 14 accepted into
the second round which was announced in August 2009 [27]. The remaining
candidates in the second round are BLAKE, Blue Midnight Wish, CubeHash
(Bernstein), ECHO (France Telecom), Fugue (IBM), Grøstl (Knudsen et al.),
Hamsi, JH, Keccak (Keccak team, Daemen et al.), Luffa, Shabal, SHAvite-
3, SIMD and Skein (Schneier et al.). The winner of the hashing function
development competition and publication of the new SHA-3 standard are
scheduled to take place in 2012.
2.8 Court Admissible Evidence
Since the United States leads the way with the implementation of many
standards in relation to evidence handling and the court admissibility of
evidence, many other countries look to the procedures outlined by the United
States in this area when attempting to create their own legal procedures
[28]. As a result of this, much of the information available regarding the
admissibility of digital forensic evidence into court cases is specifically tailored
to the Unites States, but will influence law makers across the globe. Carrier [2]
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states that in order for evidence to be admissible into a United States legal
proceeding, the scientific evidence (a category which digital forensic evidence
falls under in the U.S.) must pass the so-called “Daubert Test” (see section 2.8.1
below). The reliability of the evidence is determined by the judge in a pre-
trail “Daubert Hearing”. The judge’s responsibility in the Daubert Hearing is
to determine whether the methodologies and techniques used to identify the
evidence was sound, and as a result, whether the evidence is reliable.
2.8.1 Daubert Test
The “Daubert Test” stems from the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in
the case of Daubert vs. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) [29]. The Daubert
process outlines four general categories that are used as guidelines by the
judge when assessing the procedure(s) followed when handling the evidence
during the acquisition, analysis and reporting phases of the investigation, [2]
and [29]:
1. Testing – Can and has the procedure been tested? Testing of any
procedure should include testing of the number of false negatives, e.g.,
if the tool displays filenames in a given directory, then all file names
must be shown. It should also incorporate testing of the number of false
positives, e.g. if the tool was designed to capture digital evidence, and it
reports that it was successful, then all forensic evidence must be exactly
copied to the destination. The U.S. National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) have a dedicated group working on Computer
Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT) [30].
2. Error Rate – Is there a known error rate of the procedure? For example,
accessing data on a disk formatted in a documented file format, e.g.,
FAT32 or ext2, should have a very low error rate, with the only errors
involved being programming errors on behalf of the developer. Acquir-
ing evidence from an officially undocumented file format, e.g., NTFS,
may result in unknown file access errors occurring, in addition to the
potential programming error rate.
3. Publication – Has the procedure been published and subject to peer
review? The main condition for evidence admission under the prede-
cessor to the Daubert Test, the Frye Test, was that the procedure was
documented in a public place and undergone a peer review process.
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This condition has been maintained in the Daubert Test [2]. In the area
of digital forensics, there is only one major peer-reviewed journal, the
International Journal of Digital Evidence.
4. Acceptance – Is the procedure generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community? For this guideline to be assessed, published guidelines are
required. Closed source tools have claimed their acceptance by citing the
large number of users they have. The developers of these tools do not
cite how many of their users are from the scientific community, or how
many have the ability to scientifically assess the tool. However, having
a tool with a large user base can only prove acceptance of the tool; it
cannot prove the acceptance of the undocumented procedure followed
when using the tool.
In 2005, The House of Commons Science Science and Technology Committee
in the United Kingdom published a report entitled “Forensic Science on Trial”
[28]. In this report they outline numerous standards to be used across the
field of forensics. As part of this report, the admissibility of expert evidence is
discussed. As it stood in the UK when the report was written, the judge of any
given case had the role of the “gate-keeper” for any evidence he would admit
into his court. It was determined that judges are not well-placed to determine
the scientific validity without input from scientists, especially due to the
absence of an agreed protocol for assessment. The main recommendation to
come from the report is that the Forensic Science Advisory Council should
develop a “gate-keeping” test for expert evidence, built in partnership with
judges, scientists and other key players from the criminal justice system and
that it should be built upon the US Daubert Test [28].
2.9 Summary
This chapter describes some related work to the system described in chapter
3. It outlined some of the tools, formats, tests and procedures used for the
acquisition and analysis of digital forensic evidence. This chapter also outlined
some digital forensic tools and systems developed for aiding digital forensic
investigations. Traditionally, in order for a digital forensic investigation to
begin, the investigator must physically visit the crime scene and collect any
suspect computer equipment. This equipment will then be brought back to
the forensic laboratory. Once the computer equipment is in the evidence store,
26
it may then be imaged using one of the forensic tools outlined in 2.3.3 and
2.3.4.
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CHAPTER
THREE
Design and Architecture
3.1 Introduction
The proposed system is concerned with the first step in any digital forensic
investigation; the acquisition phase, as outlined in 2.2. This system’s main
goal is to reduce the time taken to acquire the necessary evidence and is called
RAFT (Remote Acquisition Forensic Tool). RAFT is a digital forensic hard
drive imaging tool designed to boot off a Linux Live CD or USB memory
stick and capture a copy of the storage devices on the suspect computer.
A brief overview of the RAFT system is depicted in Fig. 3.1. The suspect
computer is booted using a customised Linux Live distribution and any
hard drive or removable media connected to the computer are able to be
securely imaged over an Internet connection directly to the RAFT Server. This
system is designed to equip any law enforcement or investigating officers
with the ability to easily perform digital evidence acquisition, which would
traditionally require the expertise of an on-site forensic investigator. One key
Suspect Computer 
booted using RAFT
RAFT Server in 
Forensic Lab
Secure Internet Connection
Figure 3.1: Fundamental design of the RAFT system.
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objective of the RAFT system is to ensure that the evidence it gathers is court
admissible. This is achieved by ensuring that the image taken using RAFT is
forensically verified to be identical to the original evidence.
The RAFT system is based on a client/server architecture, as illustrated in Fig.
3.2. The client side of the RAFT System is designed to be as easy to operate as
possible and to require minimal training for the user. In order for the RAFT
Client to be used, the suspect computer must be booted from a Live CD or
from a USB flash drive. In order for the user to know the procedure involved
in booting a computer up, s/he must be trained in the boot selection process
and have access to associated documentation. The RAFT server is a multi-
threaded server which can accept connections from multiple different RAFT
clients simultaneously.
3.2 Technical Requirements
When considering the design of any digital evidence acquisition system, such
as that described as part of this thesis, it was important to consider some of the
technical requirements. These technical requirements include:
• Verifiability – All evidence collected using the system must be verifiable
to the original source. The system must interact with the evidence and
suspect system in a forensically sound manner. All evidence interactions
must be controllable and reproducible.
• Compatibility – The system should be capable of working on a vari-
ety of computer systems built on many types of different categories
of hardware, e.g., servers, workstations, laptops, netbooks etc. The
manufacturer of the computer system should have no influence over the
performance of the system.
• Cost efficiency – The cost of implementing the system for any law
enforcement agencies or private digital investigators should be as low
as possible. Current tools and software can be prohibitively expensive
to implement for smaller organisations, e.g., one FRED workstation can
cost over $9000 [10].
• Usability – The client side of the system should not be overly complicated
to use. The target user groups, i.e., mainly law enforcement officers,
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should be considered when designing the user interface. The tool should
require minimal training to use.
• Scalability – The system should be able to scale to any required size.
Moore’s Law has been commonly used to predict the progression of
computer equipment since 1965 [31]. Computer processing power,
storage capabilities and network speeds will vastly improve in the future.
The system should be capable of taking advantage of this predictable
advancement.
• Multiple User Capability – The system should have the ability to be used
by multiple users simultaneously. This means that the system must be
capable of collecting evidence from numerous geographically separated
sources at once.
• Extensibility – The system must have the ability to be updated with new
extensions, such as conforming to a specific digital forensic evidence
storage format as outlined in 2.5.
3.3 Architecture
Figure 3.2 shows the client/server architecture of the RAFT system. The RAFT
Client is designed to be booted on the suspect computer. The components
incorporated into the RAFT Client’s customised Ubuntu Live Linux operating
system include the Drive Handler and the RAFT Client application. The Drive
Handler detects all storage devices connected to the suspect computer during
the boot process and mounts them in the operating system as read-only. The
client application deals with the user interaction, evidence acquisition, digital
fingerprinting and listening for communications from the RAFT Server over a
secure encrypted SSH connection. In this architecture, the evidence acquisition
operates over a SFTP connection ensuring the security of the data transfer. The
RAFT Server is designed to be located in a forensic laboratory. A SFTP server
deals with receiving the collected evidence. The server application deals with
the management of the evidence verification and recombination. The final part
of the architecture is the Network Attached Storage which is the device which
will store all the collected evidence upon successful transmission.
The components of the RAFT Client and Server are described in greater detail
in sections 3.4 and 3.5.
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Figure 3.2: RAFT System Architecture
3.4 RAFT Client
The RAFT Client collects forensic evidence as efficiently and quickly as
possible and transmits it to the server. It is implemented in such a way
as to operate alongside a collection of open source software and tools, e.g.,
Ubuntu, OpenSSH and DCFLDD. It contains three primary modules which
have been integrated into the Ubuntu live operating system; the hard drive
and removable media detection and auto-mount module, the graphical user
interface module and the hashing and evidence capturing/imaging module,
as can be seen in Fig. 3.3.
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RAFT Client
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· Each chunk is received and a hash is 
calculated. This hash is then compared to 
the original hash.
· If the hashes match, an acknowledgement 
is sent to the RAFT Client. If the hashes 
differ, a failure notification is sent to the 
client which requests the re-transmission 
of that chunk.
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the correct order, to form the original 
image.
· A final hash is taken of the compiled 
image and verified against the first hash.
· If it matches, the image acquisition from 
the suspect computer has been successful.
Figure 3.3: Overview of the steps involved, both client and server side, in
verifiable image acquisition using RAFT.
3.4.1 Ubuntu Live CD
The RAFT Client is installed on a customised lightweight copy of the Ubuntu
Live Linux distribution [32]. All unnecessary software and modules should be
removed from the operating system to improve performance, e.g., OpenOffice,
GIMP etc. Ubuntu is an ideal live operating system to choose for a number of
reasons:
1. The standard Ubuntu install disk comes packaged with a live Linux dis-
tribution. This live disk is bootable on any computer, i.e., regardless for
which operating system(s) the suspect computer has installed; Windows,
*NIX or MAC OS.
32
2. The compatibility of the live operating system to read numerous different
hard drive formats, e.g., FAT, FAT16, FAT32, NTFS, ext, ext2, ext3, HFS,
HFS+, etc.
3. The ability for the live distribution to be fully customised removing
any unnecessary software, while having the ability to easily include the
RAFT Client and associated software (such as dcfldd [4], OpenSSH [33]
and SSH Filesystem [34]).
4. The ability to include a boot up hard drive and removable media auto
mounting script which automatically mount all attached drives and
storage as read-only.
3.4.2 Automatic Drive Mounting Module
When the Ubuntu Live CD is booted on the suspect computer, all the attached
hard drives and removable storage devices currently connected to the host
computer are automatically mounted as read-only, e.g., USB flash drives,
external hard drives, memory cards, digital cameras, CDs etc. It is imperative
that all the connected storage devices are mounted in a read-only state as
any accidental writing to the drives could deem the evidence collected as
compromised.
3.4.3 Hashing and Evidence Transmission Module
The hashing and evidence transmission module is the segment of the RAFT
client responsible for the actual acquisition process. The module instantiates
bash shells and executes and monitors the acquisition code. The tool used for
the data copying is DCFLDD.
This module is also in communication with the RAFT server. It listens for
acknowledgements of successful chunk transfers. Should a chunk fail the
verification process, an unsuccessful acknowledgement is received from the
server. In this instance, it is necessary to re-add that chunk to the queue for
retransmission.
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Secure File Transfer over 
Internet Connection
RAFT Client running on suspect PC
RAFT Server running in forensic lab
...
Original Hard 
Drive
Verified Hard 
Drive Image
Hard 
Drive 
Chunks
1 2 3 XX - 1X – 2
...1 2 3 XX - 1X – 2
Figure 3.4: Overview of RAFT imaging architecture. This diagram shows the
regular operation of the RAFT system, i.e., no dropped connections and no
failed verifications. X = number of chunks to transfer entire disk image.
3.4.4 Graphical User Interface Module
The graphical user interface is designed to be as intuitive as possible. When
the live Ubuntu operating system is finished booting up, the RAFT client
is automatically launched. When the application is displayed, there are
two options available to the user; “Automatically Collect All Evidence” and
“Advanced”. The first option is self-explanatory, whereas the advanced option
displays a list of all detected devices, partitions and removable media. This
option enables the user to collect evidence from certain storage devices as a
priority over other devices. This option could enable faster analysis of data
collected with a high probability of containing incriminating evidence, e.g., in
a child abuse investigation, collecting evidence from memory cards or attached
cameras may take priority over other data sources.
In a production scenario, the first window presented to the user when
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launching the RAFT client would be a password entry box. The password for
this system would be changed frequently and client side password verification
would ensure that the tool could only be used by desirable users. This would
eliminate the use of the RAFT client, should a copy of the tool get into the
wrong hands. If the password required to state the RAFT client was changed
by the server in the middle of a transmission of evidence, it would not affect
the transmission as the password is only verified at the start of the RAFT client.
This would be a requirement for evidence acquisitions that may take longer
than the frequency of server-side password change.
3.5 RAFT Server
The RAFT Server is a multi-threaded system. When the server is running,
it listens for a connection on any of its pre configured ports. When a new
client connects to it, it creates a new space on the server where it stores all
relevant files. Each new drive or volume imaged from the suspect computer is
then stored within that space. The server contains two additional modules for
the verification of the collected data chunks and for the recombination of the
chunks to form a copy of the original source. The multi-threaded design of the
server enables numerous concurrent RAFT Client connections.
3.5.1 Forensic Verification Module
Each chunk, when successfully transferred, is hashed on the server and
compared against the original hash. If these hashes differ, a failure notification
is sent to the RAFT Client which will result in that particular chunk being re-
transmitted. A sample sequence of interactions between the client and server
for a three chunk acquisition are shown in Fig. 3.5. As can be seen, the
server side verification and recombination of the receiving chunks takes place
simultaneously with the receiving of the following chunk.
3.5.2 Recombination and Storage
Upon the successful transmission of all the chunks belonging to a particular
drive, they are recompiled back into a single file, hashed and verified against
the original hash value taken by the RAFT Client before the imaging process
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Client Sending Chunk
Client Computing Hash
Client Sending Hash
Server Computing Hash
Server Verifying Hash
Server Sending ACK
Time
Client Records Success
First Chunk
Last Chunk
Middle Chunk
Figure 3.5: Sample timeline of the RAFT system in operation showing the
overall impact of the verification process over the (not to scale).
commenced. An image acquisition is only successfully complete when this
original hash matches which results in a “completed transfer” notification
being sent to the RAFT Client. This recompiled hard drive image is then stored
on a network attached storage (NAS) device, similar to the process involved
in ”traditional” forensic evidence acquisition.
3.6 Evidence Handling and Storage
As with any evidence handling tool, the procedures used to transfer and store
the data are important to ensure forensic integrity of the data. The RAFT
system is designed to ensure the integrity of the collected evidence at every
phase of the acquisition.
3.6.1 Evidence Handling
The data collected using the RAFT system is acquired from a read-only moun-
ted hard disk. This ensures that the original source cannot be compromised
by any of the operations of the RAFT system. The data is sent directly to
the RAFT server in an uncompressed format which ensures that no deleted
evidence or any evidence in the slackspace of the drive is lost. Due to the large
size of the data transmission, the evidence is sent from the client in chunks and
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these chunks are then recombined at the server side to produce the complete
image of the original disk. As the hard disk image is treated as a binary file
during the splitting and recombination processes, the chance of either process
compromising the integrity of the data is eliminated. This is proven at the
server when the data is recombined and the hash sum of the final image is
compared with the untouched hash sum of the original source.
3.6.2 Evidence Storage
The “raw” data storage format outlined in 2.5.2 was chosen as the storage
format for all evidence collected using the RAFT system. This format was
chosen for a number of reasons:
1. The raw format of storing data is the de facto standard for all digital
evidence acquisition tools [13]. While some tools may have their own
proprietary standards, every tool has an option to image the disk in
question using the raw format.
2. All evidence analysis tools are capable of reading and analysing the
evidence contained in a raw format file.
3. The likelihood of any deleted evidence being destroyed during the
imaging process is completely eliminated due to the nature of the format,
i.e., each bit of the hard disk is captured including all of the slackspace.
4. Due to the fact that the raw format is an exact bit-by-bit copy of the
original evidence, it lends itself well to being split into small chunk sizes,
as required by the design of the RAFT system.
5. Acquiring an image using the raw format requires the least amount of
processing power client-side. This can be particularly advantageous
when collecting evidence from low-powered computers, e.g., older
computers, netbooks, etc.
The RAFT system also stores some metadata alongside the evidence collected
such as disk information (unique disk identifier, size, partition information,
hash sum), number of chunks used to transfer the image and associated hash
sums and time stamps of transmission.
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3.7 Verifying Data Integrity
The verification of the collected data to the original source is fundamental to
the RAFT system. This data integrity is insured in the RAFT system by the
implementation of regular hash checking on the data being transferred using
SHA-512, a 512-bit secure hashing. Once the RAFT Client is booted and a
drive is selected for imaging, the first step is to calculate the hash value for the
original drive. During the imaging process, the integrity of each of the chunks
being transferred is maintained due to a SHA-512 hash being computed as
the chunk is being transmitted. At the server side, once the transmission
is complete, a SHA-512 hash is taken on the chunk and verified against the
original. If these hashes do not match, i.e. the integrity of that chunk has been
compromised in transmission, a failure notification is sent to the client, which
queues that chunk up again for transmission.
3.7.1 Overhead for Ensuring Data Integrity
The requirement for any digital forensic evidence capturing tool to ensure
integrity is paramount. While one of the primary objectives of RAFT is to
verify the integrity of the evidence, it is also important that the additional
computational and network overhead is minimised. This is achieved by
overlapping the computational tasks with the data transmission.
When the first chunk is transmitted completely to the server, the client
immediately starts sending the second chunk. When the server receives the
first chunk and its corresponding SHA-512 fingerprint (computed client-side),
it then calculates a SHA-512 hash on the chunk received and compares it to the
client-side hash. If these hash values match, an acknowledgement is sent to
the client to signify a successful transmission. This process is then repeated for
the third and all subsequent chunks. Due to the computational/transmission
overlap, the additional cost of forensically verifying the evidence captured as
part of the RAFT system amounts to the time taken to compute the SHA-512
hash server-side of the last chunk and compare this to the hash value taken
client-side.
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3.8 Resilience against Hacking/Hijacking
For any digital forensic tool to be considered for use in a real-world law
enforcement scenario, the tool must be reliable and resilient against any
hacking or hijacking attempts. The RAFT client accomplishes this goal by
implementing the following sanctions:
1. Encrypted Communication – All communications between the client and
server are sent over an encrypted SSH connection.
2. Encrypted File Transfer – All data is transmitted using the secure transfer
protocol (SFTP), which sends the data through an encrypted tunnel to
the server.
3. Data Verification – Each chunk of evidence transmitted is hashed by the
client during transmission and subsequently hashed by the server upon
receipt. Only when these hashes match is each chunk deemed by the
system to be successfully transferred.
4. Closed Source System – The source to the RAFT system is closed source.
This improves the system’s security by increasing the difficultly for any
potential intruders by forcing them to reverse engineer the operational
procedures of the system.
In order for the system to be compromised, all of the above sanctions would
have to be overcome on-the-fly when the system is in use. While it is currently
infeasible to succeed in hacking/hijacking all the above security features,
theoretically it may well be possible in the future. The most infeasible part
of the above features to hack is to overcome the data verification. The RAFT
system uses the SHA-512 hash function, which results in it being particularly
resilient against collisions. As of 2009, the only common hash functions greater
than 128-bits in length where collisions have been engineered are MD5 and
SHA-1. A key point to note about these collisions is that both files were
engineered in such a manner to produce the same hash sum, i.e., it is relatively
much easier to engineer two files with the same hash when compared to the
task of creating a file with a hash that matches an existing file. To compromise
the verification process deployed in the RAFT system, the engineered file (with
incriminating data removed or with extra data inserted) would have to match
the original chunk being transmitted over the encrypted data connection. In
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the following sub-sections, the difficulty of compromising each step in the
acquisition process is discussed.
3.8.1 Compromise Client Distribution
Should a copy of the RAFT client become lost and was acquired by parties
interested in cracking the system, they would still need access to the frequently
changing server-side password to analyse the operation of the system. Should
the attackers reverse engineer the operation of the RAFT client, i.e., determine
the data verification process, encryption specifications, etc., this knowledge
will still not aid them in cracking the system. The sheer work factor of cracking
the SHA-512 algorithm to force a collision results in any such attack being
unfeasible.
3.8.2 Compromise during Transmission
In order for the evidence collected by the RAFT system to become comprom-
ised during transmission, the following steps must occur on-the-fly during
transmission for each chunk:
1. The encrypted TCP packet stream must be detected and hijacked.
2. The chunk being transmitted must be intercepted.
3. The hash of this chunk must be computed and another chunk with
compromised data must be created, with a matching SHA-512 hash sum.
4. This newly created chunk must be transmitted to the server.
Assuming the attacker is aware that the evidence is being transmitted to the
RAFT server and is able to detect and identify the encrypted TCP packet
stream, he must then successfully hijack the stream. The second step involves
intercepting the data stream, decrypting the 128-bit encrypted data (with the
exact encryption method not known to the attacker) and building up the
chunk being transmitted. This chunk must then be hashed using the SHA-
512 hash function (the exact data verification process used in the system will
be unknown to the attacker) and another chunk must be engineered with the
incriminating evidence removed. This chunk must then be transmitted to the
server along the existing TCP stream. Assuming the above steps were feasible,
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in order for the evidence to be compromised in this manner, a significant
amount of system knowledge is required on behalf of the attacker. The
combined complexity of each of the above steps results in it being entirely
impossible, given the work factor of each of the required steps — Let alone
that it would be possible to occur on-the-fly when the tool is working.
3.8.3 Compromise Server
The RAFT server could be ran on any operating system or hardware config-
uration. In order for the server to be resilient against attack, only the ports
required by the RAFT system should be opened on the machine. A software
and a hardware firewall could also be deployed to ensure system security.
By limiting the open ports on the server, the chance of the server becoming
compromised is reduced significantly.
3.9 Advantages over Traditional Tools
The RAFT system has a number of advantages over traditional forensic tools.
Some of the advantages are valid for using the RAFT system even in a forensic
laboratory setting, e.g., using RAFT over a local area network still maintains
some advantages over traditional tools. These advantages are outlined in the
following subsections:
3.9.1 Compatibility
One obvious advantage of using the RAFT system is that it is irrelevant what
configuration the suspect PC has i.e. RAFT is compatible with whatever
interface or formatting the suspect hard drive or media might have. Take
netbooks as an example: they come in many differing storage configurations,
even within the same brand. Some netbooks use regular 2 1/2“ IDE or SATA
laptop hard drives whereas some use flash storage. These flash storage devices
can be soldered directly to the motherboard, connected via a regular IDE or
SATA connection or connected via a mini-PCI/mini-PCIe connection. RAFT
has no limitation on what hardware configuration the suspect computer has;
the RAFT client is configured to automatically mount and securely image any
system configuration.
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Should the RAFT client be deployed in a forensic laboratory, the compatibility
of the system to collect data from any system is of a significant advantage over
the traditional tools. Due to the fact that RAFT is a purely software driven
solution, the requirement to have hardware write-blockers at hand for every
conceivable storage device connection is eliminated.
3.9.2 Cost
The cost involved in running the RAFT system is almost entirely the cost of
setting up the RAFT Server. The requirements for the RAFT server would be
a high-end computer with the highest speed Internet connection possible (the
higher the speed, the less likelihood of running into server-side bottlenecks).
It would also be required to have a large amount of available storage, be it
local storage or connected network attached storage (NAS). The traditional
method of dealing with digital forensic acquisition and analysis involves the
storage of hard disk images on a large network storage device. If the additional
cost of implementing the RAFT system is compared to the cost involved in
purchasing any of the hardware acquisition tools outlined in 2.4, it is clear that
it is possible to incur significant savings. These savings could enable a law
enforcement branch to afford a fully functional digital evidence acquisition
and handling tool. Once the initial outlay is spent in setting up the RAFT
Server, the cost for using and re-producing the RAFT Client is minimal. For
example, in a law enforcement scenario, the customised RAFT Ubuntu image
can be burnt to CD or a bootable USB key and can be created as many times as
required, i.e., one of each per police station.
3.9.3 Automated Acquisition
This feature of the RAFT system results in users requiring little technological
knowledge to operate the client side of the system. Due to the system being
designed with ease of use in mind, as outlined in section 3.2, the adoption of
the RAFT system will ultimately result in digital forensic evidence acquisition
being possible in more places at once, e.g., in the law enforcement scenario
outlined above, each police station would have the capability to image a
computer without the need to have a digital forensic specialist.
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3.9.4 Speed
The RAFT system enables digital evidence to be captured by any law enforce-
ment officer in more spaces simultaneously. In the current digital evidence
acquisition model used by law enforcement, when a regular police officer is
at a crime scene and identifies one or more computers as potential evidence
sources, he must request a digital forensic investigator to travel to the crime
scene and collect the evidence. If multiple cases require evidence collection
at the same time, there can be a significant amount of wasted investigation
time. While each individual image acquisition can take some time, multiple
acquisitions can take place simultaneously and results in an overall decrease
in the time taken for multiple computers to be imaged.
3.10 Overcoming Limitations
While the RAFT system has several advantages over the traditional approach,
such as those outlined above, there are also some potential limitations as
outlined in the following sub-sections. For each of the potential limitation
described, a potential solution is provided.
3.10.1 Firewalls
The RAFT Client has to have the ability to communicate to the server, for the
transmission of the evidence. One obvious potential limitation of the system
is that a hardware firewall may be filtering the suspect computer’s Internet
connection i.e. banning specific port ranges etc. This could potentially render
the RAFT Client inoperable. One solution to this is to employ the use of a USB
mobile broadband connection, connected to the suspect computer. Current
3G wireless broadband networks are capable of upstream speeds of up to 10
Mbps, with plans for 3G LTE (Long-Term Evolution) to increase the upstream
speeds to over 50 Mbps [35]. These potential upload speed are set to improve
even further when 4G mobile broadband networks become mainstream in the
coming years. 4G networks will be capable of upload speeds of over 100
Mbps [36]. If a software firewall is installed on the suspect computer, it is
only installed to monitor the network traffic from the operating system on
the suspect computer. This will not affect the operation of the RAFT system,
as the suspect computer will then be running the customised Ubuntu Linux
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operating system.
3.10.2 Transfer Speed
The time taken to take an image of a hard drive over the Internet will
take longer than the time required if the investigator had physical access
to specialised forensic hardware in a forensic laboratory. Where RAFT can
improve on this time required for traditional hard drive image acquisition
is if the time wasted by the investigation in travelling, transportation and
storage of the suspect computer is taken into consideration. While high-speed
broadband Internet access is becoming more and more common place on
both residential and commercial levels, it would be unrealistic to assume that
every suspect computer would have an Internet connection with a favourable
upload speed, i.e., many asymmetric broadband connections are significantly
weighted towards download speeds. This limitation could again be overcome
through the use of a mobile Internet connection.
3.10.3 Potential LiveCD Incompatibility
It is possible that some suspect computers have a non-functional CD drive.
For that matter, some modern portable computers do not feature a CD/DVD
drive, e.g., most netbooks and small laptops. This issue can be overcome as the
customised Ubuntu operating system containing RAFT can also be configured
to boot off of a USB memory key. In the case of netbooks, each version available
on the market today is capable of booting from a USB flash drive or USB CD
drive as these are the only methods of loading the operating system onto the
computer.
3.10.4 Live System
Forensic investigators are increasingly concerned with the analysis of live
systems, e.g. collection of evidence of current processes, memory and other
state information. In its current from, the RAFT system is unable to collect
evidence from a live system. However, a modified version of the RAFT client
could be created to run on a live system. The downside of executing RAFT on a
live system is that there will be an unavoidable, yet predictable, change of state
of the live system. This will be one of the challenges in building such systems,
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Manufacturer Commonly Used Passwords
AWARD 01322222, 589589, 589721, 595595, 598598
, ALFAROME, ALLY, ALLy, aLLY, aLLy,
aPAf, award, AWARD PW, AWARD SW,
AWARD?SW , AWARD PW , AWARD SW ,
AWKWARD, awkward, BIOSTAR, CONCAT,
CONDO, Condo, condo, d8on, djonet, HLT, J256,
J262, j262, j322, j332, J64, KDD, LKWPETER,
Lkwpeter, PINT, pint, SER, SKY FOX ,
SYXZ, syxz, TTPTHA, ZAAAADA, ZAAADA,
ZBAAACA, ZJAAADC
AMI AMI, AAAMMMIII, BIOS, PASSWORD, HE-
WITT RAND, AMI?SW , AMI SW , LKW-
PETER, A.M.I., CONDO
PHOENIX BIOS, CMOS, phoenix, PHOENIX, Phoenix
Table 3.1: Backdoor BIOS passwords for common motherboard manufacturers
as any modification to the system, e.g., plugging in a UCD key, inserting a CD
or executing an application, will modify its state, e.g., modify the registry, log
files, volatile memory etc.
3.10.5 Boot Passwords
The CMOS (Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor) on modern mother-
boards is responsible for semi-permanently storing system information such
as the clock, memory amount, hard drive information, BIOS boot password
along with other system configuration settings. The ROM is powered by a
small battery when the system is powered down. If the suspect system is
configured with a boot password, before the user has the opportunity to boot
up the RAFT Client, s/he must insert their password. In the quite likely event
that this password is unknown, there are three options available to the user:
1. Reference documentation – All motherboard manufacturers incorporate
a backdoor CMOS password into the BIOS. For the user to determine
the correct password it will be necessary to reference documentation to
retrieve this password. A sample list of common BIOS manufacturer’s
and their associated backdoor passwords can be see in table 3. 1 [37],
[38].
While such a list may seem cumbersome if each password was attemp-
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ted sequentially, a database of computers and motherboards and their
corresponding backdoor passwords could be created to quickly facilitate
access to the correct password.
2. Hardware Password Bypass – Some motherboards contain a jumper on
the chip which, when removed, lets the user bypass any passwords
contained in the CMOS. This physical backdoor was incorporated into
the design of the motherboard as to eliminate the possibility of a
customer getting locked out of their system.
3. CMOS Reset – When the CMOS battery is removed from the mother-
board for a short period of time, e.g. less than ten minutes, the CMOS will
reset to its original state, with the factory settings for the boot password.
In most motherboards, the default factory configuration is not for this
password to be activated on boot.
Passwords further in the regular boot process of the suspect system, e.g. a
Windows login password, will have no effect on the operation of the RAFT
system as it will be the customised Live Ubuntu operating system which is
booted immediately after the BIOS.
3.11 Adoption for Different Users
To configure the system for different users, i.e., different law enforcement
departments, different private investigation companies, there are a number
of items in the system that will need to be configured:
1. Hard Coded Hostnames – Each RAFT client is built and configured for a
particular user. The live operating system needs to be modified with
hard-coded hostnames. In a production system, this would also have to
be modified with a SSH key for communication with the server.
2. Hard Drive Formats – While the standard RAFT client is capable of
reading from numerous hard drive formats, as outlined in section 3.4.1,
the tool may be required to be configured to take evidence from a
uncommon proprietary format.
3. Hardware Drivers – The drivers built in to the Ubuntu Linux are com-
patible with the majority of hardware configurations available. Should
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the RAFT client be expected to capture evidence from an uncommon
hardware device, the driver for this device may need to be included in
the live operating system.
4. Any Further Customisation – This would include any customer specific
requirements to customise the system to be compatible with their current
infrastructure. This could include adjusting the evidence storage format
to comply with any of the formats outlined in section 2.5.
3.12 Summary
The security of the RAFT system is paramount, as with any evidence handling
device. By limiting the port ranges that are left open to access from the
Internet, the chance of an attack on the server is also limited. The server
would also be protected by a software and a hardware firewall; only allowing
encrypted SSH and SFTP traffic through to the server.
This chapter also outlined a number of the advantages the RAFT system would
have over traditional tools. While no forensic tool (hardware or software)
on the market today is capable of dealing with every possible scenario, the
RAFT system is capable of overcoming many of the limitations a remote
evidence acquisition tool might face. The combined advantage of the outlined
points results in the forensic investigator being able to spend more time in
the laboratory analysing the evidence collected, as opposed to time wasted
performing menial tasks, e.g., travelling to crime scenes. Using RAFT in
combination with more intelligent forensic analysis tools, e.g., a distributed
digital forensic system [1], [39], [40], [41], the investigator will be better armed
to deal with the ever increasing amount of digital forensic cases.
The only comparable existing solution to the system outlined above is that
of the Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device Diminutive Interrogation Equip-
ment (FREDDIE), as outlined in section 2.4.2 above. This product is compar-
able with the RAFT system, in so far as they both enable on-site evidence
acquisition. A notable point to differentiate the two tools is that the cost
of purchasing each FREDDIE device starts at $8,000 [11] (price correct as of
August 2009), whereas the cost of creating an additional copy of the RAFT
client, is purely the cost of burning a CD or making a copy of the bootable USB
flash drive. The use of a FREDDIE also maintains the existing requirement for
the digital forensic investigator to physically visit the crime scene. With RAFT,
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any law enforcement officer has the immediate on-site capability of collecting
digital evidence from any machine.
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CHAPTER
FOUR
Experimentation and Results
4.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the results of testing the prototype of the RAFT
system. The RAFT client was implemented through the development of an
application and installing on a customised lightweight Ubuntu Linux LiveCD.
This chapter also includes a performance evaluation of the RAFT system. As
part of the testing process, numerous “real-world” scenarios were tested and
for the purpose of this thesis, we will discuss two of these scenarios.
4.2 Viability Testing
To test the viability of the RAFT system, each component of the client and
server needed to be prototyped and tested individually. The RAFT client
has two main components that require testing; the hard disk and storage
device detection and write-blocked mounting component and the evidence
acquisition and hashing component. To test the viability of the server side
of the RAFT system, it was required to test the hashing and verification
component and the recombination and final verification component. The
communication between the system also needed to be tested to decide upon
which protocol to use.
In order for any digital forensic tool to be considered for use in a law
enforcement scenario, the evidence it collects must be proven to be unmodified
and the tool must be proven to be reliable with reproducible results. In order to
prove this, the tool was tested to verify if the evidence collected was identical
to the original evidence source.
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The following subsections outline the results from the viability studies con-
ducted.
4.2.1 Hash Function Experiments
In order to choose the most secure hash function, i.e., the most resilient
to collisions, while still maintaining a relatively low time overhead to the
acquisition process, a number of hash functions were performance tested.
These include some of the more popular hash functions, as can be seen in
Table 2.7.2. In the tests outlined below the hash functions deemed the most
secure (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512) are performance tested
uses various input sizes to attempt to analyse the performance of each function
according to the differing input message sizes. The hashing times of the
MD5 and SHA-1 functions are also included for reference, although these
hash functions have been compromised to some extent resulting in engineered
collisions, as outlined in more detail in section 2.7.1 above. To create the test
files for hashing, “zeroed-out” files of the exact specified size were created
using the *NIX “dd” command. For example:
dd if=/dev/zero of=1GBFile bs=1073741824 count=1
When executed on a *NIX system, this command creates a file called “1GBFile”
with the input being a null file and the output file being of the specified
bytesize (1,073,741,824 bytes = 1GB).
Figure 4.1 represents a bar chart of the results obtained for testing the various
indicated hash functions. This test was conducted with a Dell Optiplex 745
with a 2.66Ghz Intel Core 2 Duo processor, 2GB 667Mhz memory and a 250GB
3.5“ 7200rpm hard drive representing the server side of the RAFT system.
The Figure shows the results, averaged out to a “per-gigabyte” value, of the
creation time for hash sums for 1GB, 2GB, 4GB, 8GB and 16GB files using each
of the hash functions. As can be seen from the chart, the average time taken
for hashing using the functions with 256-bit and below internal state sizes is
approximately linear, i.e., MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256. The exception
to this is the time taken for these algorithms to produce hash sums for the 1GB
input message. This is due to the algorithms having efficiency for hashing
smaller files. The average time required for these hash functions to produce a
hash in these tests was 19.36 seconds with a variance of ± 0.41% per gigabyte.
The time required for the algorithms with internal state sizes of greater than
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of server side hashing times for differing image sizes
(averaged to a per-gigabyte value).
256-bits was consistently found to be over double that of the other functions
outlined above. The average time for SHA-384 and SHA-512 was found to be
49.01 seconds with a variance of ±2.89% per gigabyte.
The time required during testing to produce the server side hash sums for
various file sizes is outlined in Fig. 4.2. As can be seen, this time is almost
on a linear scale, i.e., the time taken for each hash sum to be produced
approximately doubles when the input message size doubles. During the
data transmission phase of the RAFT system, these server side values are
calculated on the server upon receipt of each chunk. The hash value for
chunk X is computed when the client is transmitting chunk X+1. This method
of simultaneous data transmission and verification results in the overhead
created due to the verification process being as minimally impacting as
possible.
Table 4.2.1 shows the impact of the avalanche effect, as outlined in 2.7.2, to
the SHA-512 hash function. For this test a 400GB hard drive was hashed
twice with a minor one byte modification between tests. As can be seen, the
resultant hash sum is completely different. The chance of a collision occurring
when using the SHA-512 is approximately 1 in 1.34 x 10154. If this probability
of a collision is compared with other commonly court admissible forms of
uniquely identifying evidence, it is found to be vastly superior. For example,
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File Variation SHA-512 Hash
One byte file containing
the single character “0”
F8C7E45008E5EAED1573C6E41FA7F172
8CC7A193C17759D858F0F4757A862A97
77A2825E9CE7ACD8272A69DB079AE8E4
F563996C1EA7C28AFF34EA373D98F9AE
One byte file containing
the single character “1”
3C040891330C17E1F66951EE2DFA47E0
C05DCA805CA68B48433AAB582D79272A
6C1C0A51B3BABFCC055AF823729D8EE1
C314221BCC61476C9133F0378BBA40CB
Table 4.1: Two SHA-512 hash sums of a 400GB hard drive. One file was edited
between the tests by replacing one byte, i.e., changing a “0” to a “1”.
the chance of a collision occurring in Human DNA evidence is approximately
1 in 1 x 1041 [42] and the chance of a collision occurring in commonly accepted
human fingerprint evidence is approximately 1 in 5.86 x 107 [43].
4.2.2 File Transfer Protocols
During the testing process for the various possible file transfer protocols that
could be implemented for the RAFT system, it was found that regardless of
which protocol that was used, the transfer time for any sized files was within
a ±0.02% deviation. The file transfer protocols tested included:
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1. File Transfer Protocol (FTP) – This protocol sends the data through an
unencrypted connection to the server. While sending the data through
an unencrypted connection is not best practice for sending forensic
evidence, this protocol was included in the testing phase as a comparison
for the other secure protocols.
2. Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) – This is a very lightweight unencryp-
ted file transfer protocol. Its main advantage is that due to its lightweight
and simple nature, it requires very little memory to run. -
3. FTP over SSH (FTPS) – This protocol is also known as FTP-SSL. It was
the first secured, encrypted file transfer protocol created with the aid of
the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) wrapper. The authentication is dealt with
through the use of certificates. While FTPS performed well in testing, it
does not have the ability to resume transfers and for this reason it was
deemed unsuitable for the purposes of the RAFT system.
4. Secure Copy (SCP) – The Secure Copy Protocol is built on the BSD ”rcp”
protocol. The security of this protocol is handled by the underlying
SSH protocol. This protocol was generally found to be marginally faster
than the other protocols tested due to a more efficient transfer algorithm.
However, this extra efficiency comes at the expense of reliability of
the transfer, i.e., SCP does not require confirmations of successful data
transmission nor can it continue interrupted transfers. Weighing the
minor time difference against the reliability, this protocol was deemed
unsuitable for the use in the RAFT system.
5. SSH File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) – SFTP is sometimes referred to as
Secure FTP or SSL-FTP. This protocol handles security by being built
on top of the SSH protocol. SFTP has the ability to resume interrupted
data transfers without needing to resend the already transmitted data.
While not being the fastest protocol overall, the SFTP protocol was just
marginally slower than SCP while having a higher degree of reliability
and the ability to resume interrupted transfers. For these reasons, SFTP
was decided upon as the ideal protocol for the RAFT system.
4.2.3 Recombination
The recombination of the chunks received is handled using the *NIX “cat”
command. This command is used to append each received chunk, in the
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of imaging per gigabyte times from a residential
broadband connection with a 8.14Mbps upload speed as tested using
speedtest.net.
correct order, onto the recombined image. In testing, the time taken by the
server to append each chunk onto the end of the recombined image was less
than one second.
A sample usage of the cat command used to append each chunk received to
the end of the recombined image is shown below:
cat chunkX >> combinedimage
4.3 “Real World” Experiments
To evaluate the performance of the RAFT system, numerous scenarios were
tested. For the purpose of this thesis, we will discuss two of these scenarios
showing the typical usage of the RAFT system in residential and enterprise
evidence gathering.
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of imaging times per gigabyte from a high-
speed Internet connection with a 83.26Mbps upload speed as tested using
speedtest.net.
4.3.1 Residential Experiment
The first scenario involved imaging a suspect computer from a residential
broadband connection, with relatively low bandwidth speeds. The suspect
computer in this scenario was a Dell XPS M1330 laptop with a 2.5Ghz Intel
Core 2 Duo processor, 4GB 667Mhz memory and a 320GB 2.5” 7200rpm hard
drive. The broadband connection had a download speed of 23.82Mbps and an
upload speed of 8.14Mbps (connection speed tested using Speedtest [44]). The
result from these tests showed that the average time to acquire a 320GB hard
drive image was approximately 20 minutes per gigabyte, as can be seen in Fig.
4.3.
4.3.2 Enterprise Experiment
The second scenario incorporated imaging a target computer with a very
high-speed Internet connection with a 87.62Mbps downlink and a 83.26Mbps
upload streams (connection speed tested using Speedtest [44]). The suspect
computer in this scenario was a Dell Optiplex 745 with a 2.66Ghz Intel Core 2
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Figure 4.5: Performance comparison of hashing algorithms according to time.
Duo processor, 2GB 667Mhz memory and a 250GB 3.5“ 7200rpm hard drive.
As can be seen in Fig. 4.4, the average time required per gigabyte was 92
seconds.
4.4 Results
During the testing of the RAFT system, the performance of the imaging process
tended to be linear. As a result, all of the results discussed below have been
normalised to reflect the average performance for one gigabyte. The “dcfldd”
tool used in the RAFT system has the ability to compute the hash values at the
same time as transmitting the chunk. The four values displayed in Figures
4.4 and 4.3 show the impact of the various hashing options on the overall
performance.
One requirement of the performance evaluation of the RAFT system was to
quantify the overhead added through the secure hashing of each chunk. It
was found that the cost for the hashing of each chunk averaged at 5.3 seconds
per gigabyte (or a 0.41% increase in the time taken) as can be seen in Fig. 4.3.
The time taken for the server to verify each of the hard drive chunks received is
approximately 20 seconds per gigabyte using the SHA-256 hashing algorithm,
as can be seen in Fig. 4.6. This figure also displayed the server-side hashing
times as a comparison of three other common hashing algorithms. As can be
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Figure 4.6: Server side comparison of selected common hashing algorithms on
various file sizes (normalised to a per-gigabyte value).
seen, there is no additional overhead involved in choosing to use the 256-bit
algorithm (SHA-256) as opposed to the 128-bit algorithm (MD5) and the 160-
bit algorithm (SHA-1). However, there is a substantial cost of over double the
computational time in using the more secure 512-bit algorithm (SHA-512). The
extra time required to compute the SHA-512 hash will only impact the overall
imaging time twice; once on the RAFT Client before imaging begins, and again
when the image is completed.
Assuming no dropped image chunks during transmission, the total time (T)
required for a remote image acquisition of a hard drive size (H), chunk size
(C), with a client-side broadband upload speed (B) and a server side hashing
and verification speed (V) can be summarised by the following formula:
T =
H
B
+
C
V
(4.1)
4.5 Evidence Capture Overview
The total time taken for a complete acquisition from any suspected computer
can be split into four influencing factors:
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Figure 4.7: Pie chart displaying the proportions of each of the phases in the
successful acquisition of a 1000MB image (chunk size: 100MB).
1. Total transmission time – This is the total time required to transfer the
entire disk image, chunk by chunk, from the target computer to RAFT
server. This time value will need to incorporate the retransmission time
for any dropped connections or any chunks which fail the server side
verification process. It is notable that during testing of the prototype,
neither of these conditions that would require re-transmission were
encountered.
2. Time to produce hash value for the final chunk – Only the hashing of the final
chunk needs to be taken into consideration when calculating the total
time required to take a complete image of the suspect as the hash value
for every other chunk is calculated and verified on the fly during the
transmission its proceeding chunk.
3. Recombination of the chunks – This is the time it takes for the server to
recombine all the received chunks into a single exact replicated file of the
original evidence.
Figure 4.7 shows the result of an experiment of acquiring a 1000MB image
using the RAFT system. The Internet connection used for this experiment
was the same connection as used in the enterprise experiment, as outlined
in section 4.3.2, with a 83.26Mbps upload speed. Note that the combined
overhead for the forensic verification process and the recombination process
amounts to 2.9 seconds, from the overall acquisition time of 94.9 seconds
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(3.05% of the total time). Due to the fact that each chunk received, once
successfully verified, is then combined onto the end of the image being
acquired, the time overhead for the recombination of the chunks is solely the
time it takes to merge the last chunk onto the existing partially merged image.
4.6 Summary
The above results from testing the viability and performance of the system
described in chapter 3 prove that the system is a viable tool for the remote col-
lection of digital forensic evidence. The options available for each component
were also tested in terms of speed and reliability in section 4.2. This ensured
that the final specification of the RAFT system has a robust architecture.
A comparison was made between the chance of a collision in commonly
accepted court admissible evidence sources, i.e., a comparison was made
between human DNA and fingerprinting and the evidence collected as part
of the RAFT system. It was proven that due to the use of the SHA-512
hashing algorithm, that the chance of a collision being found in the evidence
collected using RAFT is over 10113 times less likely than a collision being found
in human DNA evidence and more than 10147 times less likely than human
fingerprint evidence.
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CHAPTER
FIVE
Conclusion and Future Work
While the time taken to image a suspect computer over the Internet is
substantially longer than the time taken using traditional forensic methods
(with direct physical access to the hard drive [45]) the traditional approach
does not factor in the time wasted by forensic professionals in the collection
of this evidence. Using RAFT could give forensic investigators the power to
remotely conduct investigations in more places at once.
One significant plus of using the RAFT system is that it is extremely cost
effective to distribute the client side of the system over many locations. In
the law enforcement scenario, this could result in every police station having a
copy of the RAFT Client. This would result in granting regular police officers
the ability to quickly image a suspect computer, after receiving any necessary
warrants.
5.1 Usage Adaptations
The proposed system in this thesis was designed to serve the purpose of
reducing the time wasted by forensic investigators while travelling to phys-
ically collect machines from crime scenes which results in them not being
able to devote enough of their time to performing the analysis of the collected
evidence. Without any modification to the system, it is also ideal for additional
usage scenarios whereby a verified secure copy from a digital storage device
may be required.
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5.1.1 Local Network Forensics
In order for the RAFT system to function on a local area network as opposed
to the Internet, the customisation process for the system would be exactly the
same as described for the Internet based system in section 3.11. The only
difference is that the hard coded hostname in the RAFT client would need to be
the IP address of the server on the local network, as opposed to the Internet IP
address. This would route the traffic over the local networking infrastructure
and avoid the Internet access requirement.
Using the RAFT tool over a gigabit LAN connection would significantly
improve the acquisition time as the bottleneck in the system would switch to
the physical storage device’s read speed as opposed to the Internet connection
speed. This would result in RAFT acquiring forensically verified evidence
in a similar amount of time as the existing acquisition tools. One significant
advantage to using the RAFT system over a LAN connection when compared
to using other forensic tools, is that the RAFT system is compatible with
numerous hardware configurations. The RAFT system will be able to acquire
evidence from any target computer with any type of storage device, e.g., IDE
hard drive, SATA hard drive, Solid State Disk (SATA or soldered onto the
motherboard), memory cards etc., so long as the target computer is able to
boot from a CD or USB flash drive.
5.1.2 Secure Verified Backup Tool
Again, without any modification to the existing system, the RAFT system
could be used as a secure, verified backup tool. As a backup tool, the user
will be able to choose which partition, hard drive or other storage drive they
would like backed up and the RAFT system will be able to ensure them that
the image was backed up and verified to be exactly the same as the original
source.
5.2 Further Development
While the objectives of the research outlined in this thesis were met, there are
some ideas and features which could be added to or used in conjunction with
the existing system to improve the overall level of functionality. Potential
modifications to the current system include implementing dynamic chunk
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sizes, remote control/remote investigation, live system acquisition and the ad-
dition of a forensically sound compression algorithm to decrease the transfer
size. There are also two additional tools that would complement the RAFT
system; a hardware device design to capture live evidence before rebooting
into the RAFT system and combining the RAFT system with a distributed
analysis system to further improve investigation time.
These modifications and complementary tools are outlined in the following
subsections.
5.2.1 Dynamic Chunk Sizes
Implementing a feature whereby the size of each chunk is calculated on-the-fly
during imaging would greatly help to reduce the time lost should a chunk be
unsuccessfully transmitted. This would dynamically decrease the size of each
chunk for slower, more unreliable connections, and increase the size for faster,
more reliable connections.
5.2.2 Remote Control and Investigation
The RAFT System could be improved upon by giving optional total remote
control of the RAFT Client to the digital forensic investigator (after a suspect
computer is booted by a law enforcement officer). If necessary, the investigator
could remotely browse files on all read-only mounted media connected to the
suspect PC without the requirement to first take an entire hard drive image.
This would enable the investigator to determine if the suspect computer is
relevant to the current case and could help focus the investigation quickly
on the computer(s) relevant to the crime being investigated. The imaging
process could also be streamlined, focusing onto the necessary hard drives
or partitions on the suspect computer, i.e., targeting the image acquisition to
the most relevant drives first.
5.2.3 Live System Evidence Acquisition
A complementing tool could be created to be used in conjunction with the
RAFT Client with the specific purpose of dealing with imaging a live system.
This tool would have the ability to collect additional evidence from a live
system before rebooting and using the RAFT client, e.g., the tool could
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collect evidence located in memory, running process information and other
system state information. While executing any program on a live system will
unavoidably alter its state, this alteration would be predictable and should not
interfere with the original evidence. The tool could incorporate a version of the
“memdump” *NIX command which is capable of taking a snapshot of all the
information that is currently stored in memory. Carrier [46] states that while
live analysis is becoming increasingly important in digital investigations, the
integrity of the evidence collected may be compromised. This is due to the
design of production operating systems which do not permit applications
to access the kernel memory of the machine. This results in the possibility
that the evidence collected from a live system could be compromised due to
countermeasures employed by the user to prevent such investigation, e.g.,
a rootkit could be installed at the kernel level which could hide running
processes or data contained in volatile memory.
5.2.4 Lossless Forensic Compression
The system could also be improved upon by eliminating unnecessary transfer
size, thus improving on the time required to collect all necessary evidence,
e.g., through the employment of a lossless forensically sound compression
algorithm. Some of the digital evidence storage formats incorporate a level
of forensically sound compression. While many of these formats are closed
source, an open source alternative could be employed, such as Generic
Forensic Zip [16].
5.2.5 Specific Hardware Device
A specific hardware device could be created to connect to a suspect computer
through an available USB connection. When powered with the USB bus, this
device would execute an automated program on the device itself, which would
be able to acquire evidence from the suspect computer via direct memory
access (DMA) channels. This device could have an amount of flash memory
incorporated into its design, such that a dump of all volatile memory could be
stored on the device.
Such a device could be combined with the existing RAFT system. The
procedure for using the system for law enforcement officers could be modified.
For example, if the computer is turned on, first plug in the hardware and wait
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for it to complete a memory dump of the target computer. Then reboot the
computer into the RAFT client as normal to collect all evidence from semi-
permanent storage sources.
5.2.6 Distributed Analysis
The RAFT system could be combined with a distributed digital forensic
analysis system to help further improve on the time taken to conduct each
digital forensic investigation, such as the systems outlined in [1], [39], [40]
and [41]. An automated pass of the evidence collected could be configured
whereby upon successful receipt of a new image, the first pass could be
configured to categorise the data contained within the image, e.g., images,
office files, Internet history etc.
5.2.7 Usability Test
As outlined as part of the technical requirements of the RAFT system in section
3.2, the client side of the tool should be relatively easy to use for regular law
enforcement officers and should require minimal training. In order to measure
this requirement, a usability test should be conducted. The usability test
should invite law enforcement officers and law enforcement digital forensic
investigators to take part. The groups should be randomly divided into two
teams, each given the same task of collecting all available digital evidence from
a suspect computer:
1. One team would not be given any instruction on how to use the tool
(besides instructions on how to boot the suspect computer using RAFT).
2. The second team would be given a short introduction to using the tool,
how it operates and the best practices while using the tool.
Should both teams achieve their task in a similar timeframe, the ease of use
of the tool would be proven. This result would also demonstrate the lack
of required digital forensic expertise to use the tool. Any feedback from the
usability testing should be integrated into the current system.
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5.3 Conclusion
The phenomenon of the ever increasing number of crimes being aided by
computers and Internet is set to continue into the future due to relative
level of anonymity provided to Internet users. As a result of this inevitable
increase in cybercrimes, digital forensic investigators’ workload is set to
increase exponentially. Any extra of the investigators’ time that can be
allocated to performing the analysis of cases will help to aid the turn around
time for investigations. This thesis proposed and validated the viability
of a forensically sound digital forensic evidence acquisition tool capable of
being used by any law enforcement officer. The tool will get the evidence
into an “investigation-ready” state in the forensic laboratory as early into
the investigation as possible. The traditional model for digital evidence
acquisition requires the digital investigator to leave the forensic lab to visit
the crime scene to collect the suspect machines. These machines may then
lay untouched (and unimaged) in an evidence store for a prolonged period
of time. During this time, potentially case critical information may lay
undiscovered. The use of the RAFT system can significantly improve on this
traditional model.
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